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LITIGATION CAMPAIGNS AND THE SEARCH FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RULES 
Mark V. Tushnet* 
This Journal's focus on appellate practice and procedure 
suggests that it might be appropriate and productive to take a 
somewhat unusual approach to Brown I and its significance. 
Brown was most important, of course, for its role in the 
transformation of American race relations. From the point of 
view of the appellate courts, Brown is significant in another 
way. Brown was the culmination of a sustained campaign of 
strategically designed litigation-or so it came to be thought.2 
Lawyers subsequently took the strategic litigation campaign 
they saw ending in the triumph of Brown as a model for their 
own causes, and developed strategies to use litigation in the 
service of a wide range of causes: women's rights, prison 
reform, abolition of capital punishment, protection of property 
rights, and the undermining of affirmative action, among 
others.3 In each of these campaigns, the lawyers of course 
sought favorable rulings from appellate courts. But-and this is 
my primary point-they typically sought favorable rulings of a 
particular type. In general, the ultimate goal was a simple and 
easily understood rule, parallel to the rule condemning state laws 
* Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Constitutional Law, Georgetown University Law 
Center. 
1. See Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 347 U. S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Bd. ofEduc., 349 U.S. 
294 (1955). 
2. My analysis of the litigation campaign concludes that the NAACP's litigation 
campaign is best understood as more catch-as-catch-can than as the systematic pursuit of a 
plan set forth in advance, but that in retrospect lawyers both within and outside the 
NAACP did reconstruct the litigation as the execution of a strategic plan. See generally 
Mark V. Tushnet, The NAACP's Legal Strategy Against Segregated Education, 1925-1950 
(U.N.C. Press 1987), on which much of what follows draws. 
3. For a discussion of other aspects of the legacy of Brown for strategic litigation 
campaigns, see Mark Tushnet, Some Legacies of Brown, 90 Va. L. Rev. _ (forthcoming 
2004). 
THE JOURNAL OF ApPELLATE PRACTICE AND PROCESS Vol. 6, No.1 (Spring 2004) 
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mandating the separation of children by race. The reason, I 
argue, is that favorable rulings that take the form of general 
standards are not nearly as useful to the cause lawyers, who 
typically have relatively limited resources and cannot afford to 
litigate the kinds of fact-intensive cases that standards (rather 
than rules) favorable to them generate. 
The NAACP's litigation campaign began with cases that 
sought to require school districts to take the equality component 
of "separate but equal" seriously. Initially the cases involved 
teachers' salaries. Some of these posed no serious litigation 
challenges, as when school boards conceded that they paid 
African American and white teachers different salaries because 
of their race. Others presented in the small the problem that 
broader equalization challenges would pose. In these more 
troublesome cases-from the litigators' point of view-school 
boards contended that they did not make their decisions 
explicitly on the basis of race, but rather paid salaries to teachers 
based on their qualifications. Penetrating that argument by 
showing that black and white teachers with equivalent 
qualifications got different salaries was sometimes difficult. 
How, for example, could one compare a teacher with a master's 
degree and five years of experience with a teacher who had no 
graduate degree but twenty years of experience? 
These litigation difficulties would have been immensely 
compounded had the NAACP attempted to enforce "separate but 
equal" with respect to the material conditions of elementary and 
secondary schools.4 The lawyers would have had to make school 
by school comparisons, measuring many different characteristics 
of the schools: their age, the quality of their plumbing, their 
athletic facilities, their science laboratories, and more. Often, of 
course, the schools for African Americans would be unequal to 
the schools for whites with respect to every one of these 
characteristics. Sometimes, though, the litigators would have to 
persuade a judge that a newer school for African Americans 
without good science laboratories was unequal to an older, 
4. Throughout, I refer to "the NAACP's lawyers," but technically the lawyers were 
employed by the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund, a distinction that became 
important in later years as the two organizations began to pursue somewhat different 
litigation agendas. 
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somewhat more run-down school for whites with better science 
labs.5 
In the abstract, these equalization cases could have gone 
forward.6 The NAACP's litigators, though, did not have the 
resources to pursue them in any systematic way. The NAACP 
staff was limited, with no more than five or six lawyers available 
at anyone time to deal with all of the legal issues the NAACP 
wanted to pursue. Further, the legal staff was located in New 
York, far from the Southern districts in which the litigation 
would have to be conducted. The legal staff tried to locate 
lawyers in each locality who could help out in carrying the 
burdens of litigation. There were few such lawyers, however, no 
more than one or two--if that-in the states in the deep South. 
Financial resources were as limited as human ones. Conducting 
equalization lawsuits would require investigations and, 
sometimes, expert testimony. The salary equalization litigation 
had its greatest successes in challenging policies in Southern 
cities and petered out as the NAACP's lawyers had to slog 
through rural districts. Equalization lawsuits dealing with the 
schools themselves would have been much worse: The most 
substantial outcomes would corne in the South's cities, but the 
investigations and comparisons there would be the most 
expensive; victories in rural areas might be easier to corne by, 
but the physical dangers of investigating and litigating in those 
districts were substantial, and the payoffs of even successful 
suits would be relatively small. 
Switching from an equalization strategy to what was called 
the direct attack on segregation-the effort to get a Supreme 
Court decision declaring that segregation as such was 
unconstitutional-made sense from the point of view of 
litigators acting under severe resource constraints.7 Later 
5. This problem was compounded as the Brown litigation proceeded and some 
Southern governors, notably James Byrnes of South Carolina, supported relatively large 
appropriations to be dedicated to upgrading the segregated schools for African Americans. 
These newer schools would have undoubtedly been better than the older schools for whites 
in some respects, but worse, despite their recent construction, in others. 
6. For a description of some early efforts in Virginia, which does not provide much 
detail on the resource question, see Peter Wallenstein, Blue Laws and Black Codes: 
Conflict, Courts, and Change in Twentieth-Century Virginia 94-96 (U. Va. Press 2004). 
7. In making the observation in the text, I do not mean to suggest that the decision to 
pursue the direct attack was dictated solely by resource concerns. In fact, the NAACP's 
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strategic litigation campaigns had a similar structure: an initial 
resource-intensive stage invoking a general standard of 
constitutional law to challenge practices in particular settings, 
followed by a change to a strategy of seeking a flat and easily 
enforced rule that would make it clear that practices in a large 
number of settings were unconstitutional. 
Before sketching the way in which this structure has 
characterized post-Brown litigation campaigns, I must note 
another part of the story as it developed. In the most general 
terms, we can call it the problem of the legally ambiguous 
victory that generates a backlash, whose effect is to· force the 
litigators to engage in a new form of resource-intensive 
litigation. Here too the story can be seen in the Brown litigation. 
Brown I was ambiguous in its identification of why segregation 
was unconstitutional. To use the terms that have since become 
common, segregation might have been unconstitutional because 
it involved a racial classification, or it might have been 
unconstitutional because it constituted a system of racial 
subordination.8 Judge John Parker noted the ambiguity in his 
opinion on remand in the South Carolina case decided along 
with Brown, writing that Brown "does not require integration ... 
[but] merely forbids the use of governmental power to enforce 
segregation.,,9 The ambiguities were made even more apparent 
in Brown II, the decision on remedy. There the Court said that 
desegregation should proceed "with all deliberate speed," that 
courts could consider "problems related to administration," but 
that "the vitality of the[] constitutional principles [stated in 
Brown 1] cannot be allowed to yield simply because of 
disagreement with them.,,10 Everyone knew that mere problems 
of administration could not justify any substantial delay in 
implementing Brown and that the Court's real concern was 
resistance predicated on "disagreement" with Brown. The 
goal had always been to obtain a declaration of segregation's unconstitutionality. 
Equalization litigation was an intennediate strategy, pursued on the way to the direct 
attack. 
8. For a recent discussion of these ambiguities, see Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: 
Antisubordination and Anticlassification Values in Constitutional Struggles Over Brown, 
117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470 (2004). 
9. Briggs v. Elliott, 132 F. Supp. 776, 777 (E.D.S.C. 1955). 
10. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300, 301. 
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Court's position made most sense if Brown did indeed require 
integration, but Brown never said what it did require. 
These ambiguities licensed Brown's opponents to defend 
extremely limited desegregation plans as entirely legal. That, in 
tum, re-created the litigation problems that the NAACP's 
lawyers had sought to overcome through the direct attack. Now, 
instead of challenging unequal facilities district by district, the 
lawyers had to challenge inadequate desegregation plans district 
by district. Eventually the courts got fed up and basically shifted 
the burden from the NAACP's lawyers to those representin~ the 
districts, forcing the latter to justify any additional delays.l By 
that time, however, real opposition to Brown's implications for 
integration had developed. Gradually Brown's admirers were 
placed on the defensive. They began to win only occasional 
victories, and often relatively small ones, and suffered 
increasingly large defeats. At the end of the story, then, from the 
litigators' point of view, they were essentially back at the 
starting point, having available to them constitutional doctrines 
that were favorable in the abstract but that they could not 
effectively enforce because of resource constraints. 
I tum now to some brief discussions of how the patterns 
revealed in the litigation associated with Brown recurred as 
other lawyers emulated the strategic litigation campaign they 
saw there. 12 The NAACP Legal Defense Fund itself pursued a 
campaign against the death penalty, believing that its 
administration was racially disproportionate and therefore an 
appropriate matter of concern to an organization dedicated to the 
interests of African Americans. 13 At its outset, that campaign 
had two components. The first was an effort to eliminate the 
availability of the death penalty in certain categories of cases-
notably, rape and robbery-where its racial impact had been 
11. See e.g. Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968) ("The burden on a 
school board today is to come forward with a plan that promises realistically to work. ... It 
is incumbent upon the school board to establish that its proposed plan promises meaningful 
and immediate progress toward disestablishing state-imposed segregation."). 
12. I condense complicated stories here and sometimes distort the actual sequence of 
events, in particular by placing in different stages events that sometimes occurred 
essentially simultaneously. 
13. For the story of the early stages of this litigation campaign, see Michael Meltsner, 
Cruel and Unusual: The Supreme Court and Capital Punishment (William Morrow 1974). 
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most severe. These categorical challenges basically failed. 14 
Second, the lawyers mounted challenges to the processes by 
which capital punishment was administered. They challenged 
the exclusion from juries of potential jurors who had principled 
objections to the death penalty, arguing that the "death 
qualified" juries that resulted were more likely to convict 
defendants and then more likely to sentence them to death; they 
challenged the instructions jurors received on the question of 
sentencing defendants to death; and they sought to obtain a rule 
that the jury that convicted the defendant could not go on to 
consider whether the defendant should be sentenced to death. 
The results of these challenges were mixed. The Supreme Court 
limited the use of "death qualified" juries, 15 but did not overturn 
existing procedures for instructing juries and allowing a single 
jury to decide both guilt and sentence. 16 
The categorical challenges were not terribly resource-
intensive, although to the extent that the categorical challenges 
sought to take advantage of a sense that African Americans 
received death sentences more often than whites did for crimes 
like rape and robbery, they did require the accumulation of some 
social-scientific evidence. The other challenges were resource-
intensive. The litigators had to develop significant records, not 
so much about the facts of the cases themselves, but about the 
social science they believed bore on their constitutional claims. 
Partly because of their mixed successes in the first stage of the 
litigation campaign against the death penalty, the litigators 
turned to the ultimate issue, the constitutionality of capital 
punishment itself. For present purposes, what is notable about 
this development is that it shifted the litigation from resource-
intensive challenges to litigation seeking a flat and easily 
administered rule. 
To the litigators' surprise, they won. 17 As with Brown, the 
victory was ambiguous. The Court held that capital punishment, 
14. One reached the Supreme Court, which disposed of it on other grounds. Boykin v. 
Ala., 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (avoiding the determination of whether capital punishment 
should be available for robbery by finding that Boykin's guilty plea was not made 
voluntarily). 
15. Witherspoon v. Ill., 391 U.S. 510 (1968). 
16. McGautha v. Cal., 402 U.S. 183 (1971). 
17. Furman v. Ga., 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
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as then administered, was unconstitutional because it led to the 
arbitrary imposition of death sentences. That held out the 
possibility that some other system of administering capital 
punishment might be constitutional if decision-makers had 
sufficient guidance to eliminate the arbitrariness. Chief Justice 
Burger's dissenting opinion provided a road-map for legislatures 
to follow. And they did. The Court then acceded to the backlash 
by upholding capital punishment under the revised statutes. 18 
After the restoration of capital punishment, litigation 
against the death penalty again took two forms. The first was, 
once again, an effort to obtain some categorical exclusions from 
eligibility for death. Some of the categorical exclusions were by 
crime-rape,19 and felony murder,20 for example. Others were 
by nature of the offender-persons with mental retardation,21 
and offenders who killed when they were young.22 These efforts 
met with mixed success. The second category involved 
challenges to the administration of capital punishment on the 
particular facts of the case. At the Supreme Court level these 
challenges were rather more successful. Once again, for 
purposes of this Essay, what matters about them is how fact-
intensive they are. It might well be the case that a very large 
proportion of all cases resulting in death sentences are infected 
by the kinds of constitutional errors the Supreme Court has 
identified in these fact-intensive cases, and yet anti-capital 
punishment litigators simply do not have the resources to win 
every legally meritorious case. 
The pattern of resource-intensive, fact-specific litigation 
followed by efforts to obtain a flat rule (followed by a backlash 
leading to a return to fact-specific litigation) also characterizes 
prison reform litigation.23 Prison reformers began by winning 
lower court decisions holding that the totality of the 
circumstances at individual prisons could amount to cruel and 
18. Greggv. Ga., 428 U.S. 153 (1976). 
19. Coker v. Ga., 433 U.S. 584 (1977). 
20. Enmundv. Fla., 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Tison v. Ariz., 481 U.S. 137 (1987). 
21. Atkins v. Va., 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
22. Stanford v. Ky., 492 U.S. 361 (1989); Thompson v. Okla., 487 U.S. 815 (1988). 
23. For a relatively optimistic view of prison reform litigation, see Malcolm M. Feeley 
& Edward L. Rubin, Judicial Policy Making and the Modern State: How the Courts 
Reformed America's Prisons (Cambridge U. Press 2000). 
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unusual punishment.24 The cases accumulated to the point that 
the Supreme Court did not have to, and never did, deal with a 
"totality of the circumstances" case on the merits.25 The "totality 
of the circumstances" approach was obviously resource-
intensive. As prison populations expanded in the 1970s and 
1980s, prison reformers narrowed their focus, seeking a 
declaration that double-ceIling-the practice of placing two or 
more prisoners in cells designed for a single inmate-was 
unconstitutional. Here too, had they succeeded, they would have 
replaced a resource-intensive standard with an easily 
administrable rule. The Supreme Court rejected the challenges, 
though. 26 
There was a congressional backlash as well. Responding to 
concerns that lower federal courts were "micro-managing" 
prisons, Congress enacted the Prison Litigation Reform Act in 
1996. For all practical purposes, the statute confined 
constitutional challenges to "totality of the circumstances" ones. 
Prison reform litigation continues, but it once again takes the 
form of litigation aimed at altering the practices at particular 
prisons, and resource limitations inevitably restrict the ability of 
litigators to achieve broad reforms. 27 
The NAACP's litigation campaign, and many of its 
imitators, sought to advance liberal causes. Conservatives too 
came to believe that strategic litigation campaigns might help 
their causes.28 Property rights litigators overreached in their 
efforts to secure constitutional rules effectively barring 
regulatory takings and development exactions, winning victories 
that fell short of their goals and forcing their litigation into the 
24. See e.g. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 1970), ajJ'd, 442 F.2d 304 (8th 
Cir. 1971). 
25. The Court endorsed the approach in Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), where 
the issue before the Court was collateral to the merits. 
26. See Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337 (1981). 
27. But cf Johnson v. Cal., _ U. S. _, 124 S. Ct. 1505 (2004) (granting certiorari to 
Johnson v. Cal., 321 F.3d 791 (9th Cir. 2003) (challenging policy of racial segregation in 
California's prisons)). 
28. Conservative litigation goes back a 100ig way. See Daniel Ernst, Lawyers against 
Labor: From Individual Rights to Corporate Liberalism (U. Ill. Press 1995) (describing 
litigation by employers against labor unions at the tum of the twentieth century and after). 
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fact-intensive form that always limits what litigation can 
accomplish for cause lawyers?9 
My final example of the role of rules in strategic litigation 
campaigns is the challenge that conservative public interest 
litigators mounted against affirmative action. Like other 
strategic litigation groups, these litigators did not have large 
staffs or financial resources.30 They carefully selected plaintiffs 
who, they believed, would present sympathetic claims. They 
hoped to obtain a flat rule effectively barring the consideration 
of race in university admissions. Constitutional doctrine, though, 
turned out to pose an obstacle to that achievement. 
Doctrinally, the anti-affirmative-action litigators sought to 
get the courts to declare that the use of race in university 
admissions processes was subject to "strict scrutiny." Satisfying 
that standard would require universities to demonstrate that race-
based admissions processes were extremely well-designed 
("closely tailored," in the constitutional jargon) as techniques of 
accomplishing extremely important ("compelling") 
governmental goals. And, the litigators believed, universities 
could never make such a demonstration. 
Careful reflection on the other major recent strategic 
litigation campaign focused on obtaining a favorable doctrinal 
structure might have given the anti-affirmative action litigators 
pause. Women's rights groups set out to get the courts to declare 
that gender-based distinctions in the law were subject to strict 
scrutiny. They never quite succeeded, even as they won 
Supreme Court victory after Supreme Court victory. Starting 
with a minor case in which the Court invalidated a statutory 
gender discrimination because it did not satisfy the 
Constitution's least demanding standard, minimum rationality,3l 
the Court gradually ratcheted up what governments had to do to 
justify gender-based discriminations, culminating in the Virginia 
Military Institute case, in which the Court held that such 
29. See e.g. Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regl. Plan. Agency, 535 U.S. 
302 (2002); Palazzolo v. R.I., 533 U.S. 606 (200l). 
30. Useful studies of conservative litigating groups include Steven P. Brown, Trumping 
Religion: The New Christian Right, the Free Speech Clause, and the Courts (U. Ala. Press 
2002); Clint Bolick, Voucher Wars: Waging the Legal Battle over School Choice (Cato 
Inst. 2003); and John P. Heinz, Anthony Paik, and Ann Southworth, Lawyers for 
Conservative Causes: Clients, Ideology, and Social Distance, 37 L. & Socy. Rev. 5 (2003). 
31. Reedv. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971). 
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discriminations required "exceedingly persuasive 
justification[s].,,32 The Court described this as "skeptical 
scrutiny,,,33 not quite strict scrutiny but something constitutional 
law professors have come to describe as "intermediate" scrutiny. 
What is notable about the women's rights litigation 
campaign is that it was clearly a massive success even though it 
never accomplished what its designers wanted. Indeed, the Court 
managed to transform the standard of review from mere 
rationality to "skeptical scrutiny" without ever acknowledging 
that it was in fact ratcheting up the requirements.34 A careful 
reader of the Court's opinions might have taken the lesson of the 
women's rights litigation to be that the standard of review did 
not really matter. How it was applied did. The applications of 
the various standards the Court articulated in the women's rights 
cases were almost uniformly favorable to the strategic litigators. 
In the end, the anti-affirmative-action litigators got the 
doctrine they favored, but in doing so suffered a substantial 
defeat for their overall goals. The Michigan affirmative action 
decisions held, as the litigators wanted, that the use of race in 
university admissions was indeed subject to strict scrutiny.35 In 
the case involving undergraduate admissions, the Court 
invalidated a system in which applicants from minority groups 
were awarded a fixed number of points towards admission, but 
in the case involving law school admissions, the Court upheld a 
system in which race was taken into account in what the Court 
thought was a sufficiently flexible way, by means of reviews by 
admissions officials of the entire file of each applicant. 
From the litigators' point of view, this combination of 
results amounts to a real defeat. Instead of eliminating all 
admissions programs that take race into account, the Court 
struck down only those that did so in an unreasonable or 
inflexible way. Future challenges to affirmative action programs 
32. us. v. Va., 518 U.S. 515,534 (1996) (quoting Miss. Ufor Women v. Hogan, 458 
U.S. 718, 724 (1982)). 
33. /d. at 53l. 
34. The key opinion, which was not for the Court, may have been Justice William J. 
Brennan's plurality opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973), which 
demonstrated beyond doubt that the Reed decision, see note 31, supra, actually had already 
abandoned the "mere rationality" standard. After Frontiero, just about everyone knew that, 
whatever the words, the standard the Court was using was getting increasingly stringent. 
35. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003). 
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will have to resemble the equalization litigation the NAACP 
abandoned; they can take the form only of challenges to 
particular programs, on a school-by-school basis, for being 
insufficiently flexible. Like the equalization litigation, these 
challenges will be resource-intensive, because the challenges 
will have to gather substantial information through discovery to 
determine exactly how a nominally flexible program is actually 
being implemented. Further, a decision striking down a program 
at one school will have few implications for programs at other 
schools, whose lawyers will certainly be able to point to 
differences in flexibility that, they will claim, are sufficient to 
distinguish their programs from the invalidated one. The anti-
affirmative action litigators are unlikely to have sufficient 
resources to make a serious dent in university affirmative action 
programs. 
My focus on one small facet of the litigation campaign that 
culminated in Brown v. Board of Education may seem peculiar 
in seemingly failing to appreciate that decision's monumental 
importance in twentieth century history and law. In modest self-
defense, I suggest that great decisions are great because they 
send their tendrils out in many directions, not all of which are 
obvious at the moment they are decided. Brown set a pattern for 
later litigation campaigns. Its effort to transform segregation 
litigation from a fact-intensive activity into a rule-based one was 
repeated by other litigation campaigns. So was the fact that 
Brown's success in doing so was followed by a backlash that 
reintroduced fact-intensive litigation at a different, but equally 
important, stage of the litigation. The lesson to be learned from 
this perspective is a small one, perhaps, but I think an important 
one. 
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